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Poetic Witness in a Networked Age
Abstract
When online videos mobilize protestors to occupy public spaces, and those protestors
incorporate hashtags in their chants and markered placards, deliberative democratic theory must
no longer dismiss technology and peoples historically excluded from the arena of politics.
Specifically, political models must account for the role of repetition in paving the way for
unheard and unseen messages and people to appear in the political arena. Drawing on Judith
Butler’s theory of the Performative and Hannah Arendt’s Space of Appearance, this paper
assesses that critical and generative role of iteration. Repeating unheeded acts performs the
capacity for those acts to be entered into discourse. The World Wide Web evidently augments
such performativity with features such as accessibility, potential for ‘viral’ proliferation, and an
endurance unlike non-networked acts. This paper eventually grapples with the hazards and risks
of networked repetition (e.g. desensitization, trivialization, etc.) in order to propose a poetics of
repetition to mitigate those dangers. Such poetics ultimately distinguishes the witness from the
spectator.
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Paving the Way for Appearance
Deliberative democratic theories, although operating through the processes of pluralism,
recognition, and response, are often built on presupposing fields of recognition that determine
what can be registered in the political arenas and what cannot. The problem of unheard and
unseen people and acts seem inextricable to political models despite efforts to idealize a truly
inclusive, communicative, and politically productive framework. Both optimistic democratic
efforts and models that fall short are built on what Arendt calls the Space of Appearance, the
foundational space of politics wherein political agents “[act] and [speak] together” (Arendt 198).
In order to engage in such discourse, however, political subjects must appear to one another.
Repetition, I argue, serves as an answer to this restrictive and marginalizing problematic – in that
when one repeats the unheeded, they pave the way for those neglected people and acts to appear
in the Arendtian space. Where the scholarship on publicity and politics converge, repetition
offers a salve to the perennial issue of political theory: exclusion.
Although scholarship on publicizing has its modern foundations in Enlightenment
thought, in 1962, Jürgen Habermas reinvigorated the debate with his sociological The Structural
Transformation on the Public Sphere. The critical sociologist’s object of immanent critique was
the normative concept of the “bourgeois public sphere” in which “private people come together
as a public” in order to engage public authorities “in a debate over the general rules governing
relations in the basically private but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social
labor” (Public Sphere 27). The public sphere sets aside the social and economic status of its
participants; Habermas writes that “laws of the market were suspended as were laws of the state”
(36). Regrettably, the public sphere undergoes what Habermas calls “refeudalization” as the
emerging institutions of the sphere (e.g. the press, etc.) become “complexes of social power” –
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specifically governed by the propertied bourgeoisie (188). While exalting the rational and critical
aspects of the public sphere, Habermas condemns its privatization. Habermas assesses how
capital-driven mass media undermines critical publicity.
Contemporary critics of Habermas’s ideal public sphere recognize its exclusive aspect. At
the outset, Habermas disregards what Craig Calhoun and other thinkers call the “plebeian public
sphere” (Calhoun 39). In other words, Habermas’s theory presupposes the emancipatory
supremacy of the bourgeois public sphere over its alternatives. Unlike the bourgeoisie, plebeians
were less likely to be literate or have as much leisure. Those facts do not exclude them from
forming discursive groups. Habermas himself reflects on these debates, and while maintaining
that his concept is in fact a normative ideal, he accepts critique. In “Further Reflections on the
Public Sphere,” written 30 years after Structural Transformation, Habermas concedes that “[i]t is
wrong to speak of one single public” while suggesting that the bourgeois public sphere may
nevertheless facilitate the rational arrival of egalitarian class theory (424-5). Moreover, he notes
that Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of the Carnival convinced him of the counter-effects of the
exclusion from the bourgeois public sphere, the “inner dynamics of plebeian culture.” The
Carnival’s periodic, creative “counter-project” accomplishes radical classlessness on the basis of
material exclusion (427). Carnivals too underscore a different aspect of expression in which
performance trumps rationality. Habermas confirms the existence of alternative publics separate
and in reaction to the bourgeois sphere.
Markedly, publics based on embodied exclusion persist against the horizon of the public
sphere. In his response to Structural Transformation, Michael Warner regards the normative
bourgeois public sphere as a “utopia of self-abstraction,” from which audience members “[adopt]
a very special rhetoric about their own personhood.” The public sphere, according to Warner,
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operates upon a “principle of negativity” which claims that “the validity of what you say in
public bears a negative relation to your person.” This principle brackets social and economic
status; rationality replaces celebrity, money, and rank as bases on which to judge a public’s
addressors. Outside of status, such abstraction enables members to “transcend the given realities
of their bodies” (Warner 164). But there is a cost, for when other genders, races, and sexualities
self-abstract, they forego and deny their identities; they depersonalize themselves and bracket the
basis of their material subjugation. However, much like plebeian publics, embodied identities
may also form publics separate from the public sphere. Gendered, racialized, and class-based
publics – wrought from exclusion – occur.
Whereas Habermas formulates an idealized public sphere, Warner stresses already
realized publics. At the outset, publics are different from communities and groups. The “primary
orientation” of public addresses is always an audience of strangers (56); publics are “constituted
through [the] mere attention” of strangers (87). One address (whether it be a speech, song, or
text) does not create a public. Warner stresses how publics are sustained on a “reflexive” and
historicized “circulation of discourse” (90, 96). Speakers, musicians, writers, and other
addressors employ different genres and media which are available at the time. Publics operate
with the technologies and methodologies of their day. Moreover, for example, musicians may
respond to the ideas and justifications explored in a novel. Though, in its distribution, the
reactionary song does not only address the novelist to which it responds but the impersonal
insiders attending that discussion. For Warner, these kinds of publics are discursive arenas akin
to the public sphere. Still, these “spaces of reasons” do not require total self-abstraction.
Alerting us to the spaces formed in pure antagonism to a “mass public” or public sphere
constitutes Warner’s contribution to the scholarship of publicness. He views publics as “poetic
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world making.” The “poetic and textual qualities” of addresses often trump their generalized,
rational content (114-5). That these publics are world making refers to their operative and
ongoing act of poiesis (creation). What we deem as realized public spheres are in fact publics
that are dominant, generative worlds. Warner conceives of “counterpublics,” a nuanced rendition
of Nancy Fraser’s idea of “subaltern counterpublics” (118). Whereas Fraser’s notion implies a
public of counter-discourses that challenge the dominant public’s idea of personhood, Warner’s
notion “extends…to speech genres and modes of address that constitute the public or to the
hierarchy among media” (119). Challenging the dominance of prose over poetry might be an
element of a burgeoning counterpublic. Many gendered, racialized, and class-based publics are
counterpublics in that they are excluded from and set against dominant discursive arenas.
Warner’s emphasis on poetic world-making speaks to more comprehensive counter-projects.
Counter to the Habermasian model of discourse, Iris Marion Young advances a more
inclusive ideal with communicative democracy. Her all-compassing notion “indicate[s] an equal
privileging of any form of communicative interaction where people aim to reach understanding”
(Young 125). What Warner terms counterpublicity would fall under Young’s model as
counterpublics attend to marginalized speech acts. Young, in fact, privileges greeting, rhetoric,
and storytelling as essential to discourse beside rational argumentation (129). Thereby, the
transgressive poetics of counterpublics are comprehended in this model. Moreover, participants
in a communicative democracy need not set aside their embodied realities. Young’s concept
contends against “the norms of deliberation [that] privilege speech that is dispassionate and
disembodied…[and] presuppose an opposition between mind and body, reason and emotion”
(124). Therein, Young speaks to the pertinence of bodily language but also one’s emotive
language in communication. Young is mindful of how speech and bodily language are gendered
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(123). Logically, her model extends its acknowledgement to regionalisms and vernaculars that
may be dismissed as inappropriate registers for discursive speech. The only expectation for
speech acts in Young’s model is the aim of understanding.
Young’s model seeks to resolve the problem of what should be called unheeded acts.
Deliberative democratic models, as designs of discursive arenas, may misguidedly view the
privileging of reason as the circumvention of power struggles. However, as Young clearly notes,
“deliberation is competition” (123). Mediatized address always employs some mode of rhetorical
or poetic flourish. Concision is such an example. Logical arguments can succumb into a question
of which argument is most convincing. Moreover, logical argumentation can become a battle of
which argument is impervious to disassembling. The competitive nature behind constructing the
most non-fallacious, succinct attestation is a power struggle. Young’s model instead focuses on
understanding instead of logical supremacy. The root “heed,” meaning “careful attention,” is
pertinent in assessing this issue (“heed, v.”). As Warner has noted, speech acts may be invisible
or “unheard” in certain publics. There may be instances of marginalized speech. However,
Young’s model necessitates a careful interaction with all modes of communication. Whether or
not these speech acts are rendered accessible only grounds the pertinent logic of communicative
democracy: that all communicative interaction is carefully acknowledged. Accessibility is
necessary but insufficient. Careful attention, in a comprehensive sense, is key to Young’s theory.
In actualized publics, the already attentive may lead the way towards communicative
democracy through repetition. Young’s model ends in an understanding that preserves
difference. Participants in communicative democracies seek understanding not total agreement.
Young notes that such preserved difference maintains the requirement of plurality that Hannah
Arendt deems essential to publicity (Young 127). In actualized cases of marginalized difference
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and unheeded acts, there exists challenges to publicity – particularly, the inability to be
recognized and thereby enter into the discursive arena. Young’s model, after all, is ideal; actual
publics are pluralized yet never perfectly inclusive. Recognition certainly must first be achieved
before Young’s model can be reached. If one participant in a discursive arena notes the
marginalization of a particular speech act or another participant, repetition may be a critical
mode of address. In such a case, the object of criticism would be a particular public’s field of
recognition, and through repetition as a genre of address, a participant engages in
counterpublicity. If, for instance, publicity operates on a reflexive model of “read, reflect, and
respond,” such repetition would be a response with the aim of broader readability. In other
words, certain forms of repetition seek to occasion recognition.
Such critical repetition, like other modes of counterpublicity, transgress and thereby
create new ways of seeing and being. In The Human Condition, Arendt describes the space of
appearance, “in its widest sense,” as polis, or “the space where I appear to others as others appear
to me, where men exist not merely like other living or inanimate things but make their
appearance explicitly” (Arendt 198-9). Based on its plurality and reflexivity, a public is an arena
within a space of appearance. Spaces of appearance may surely eschew certain speech acts and
bodies. Arendt decries the injustice of such marginalization by then noting that “to be deprived
[of the space of appearance] means to be deprived of reality, which, humanly and politically
speaking, is the same as appearance” (199). Absence is the condition of not being real, legible,
logical, nor rational in a particular discourse. Repetition invokes and thereby calls the absent into
reality. This, however, does not diminish the original speech act; the absent, unheeded speech act
is an explicit attempt at making one’s appearance. Unheeded acts and their echoes are critical to
restrictive spaces of appearance yet generative to some degree.
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Assembly, as a particularly embodied form of repetition, displays the generative nature of
iteration. Marches, rallies, picket lines, and other such political gatherings are deeply embodied,
collective demonstrations. Judith Butler, in her Notes towards a Performative Theory of
Assembly, argues that “the assembly is already speaking before it utters any words” (156). The
gathering of bodies is a bodily repetition. Those assembling conform their bodies to the acts of
gathering and possibly marching. Of course, chanting is an embodied linguistic act. Certain
chants are literally a collective shout of the same speech act, such as “Black Lives Matter.” There
are aspects of written repetition in the form of placards that may replicate a common calling
card, such as “Free Tibet!” When dominant publics eschew particular politics or bodies to the
point of total disregard, demonstrations are a form of counterpublicity.
However, the mere gathering itself is also a performative act. In Bodies That Matter,
Butler describes a performative as a “discursive practice that enacts or produces that which it
names” (Bodies that Matter 13). In this, Butler speaks to a long tradition of performative but
especially Jacques Derrida’s concept of Citationality. In Limited Inc, Derrida argues that such
naming is always a repetition:
Could a performative utterance succeed if its formulation did not repeat a “coded”
or iterable utterance, or in other words, if the formula I pronounce in order to
open a meeting, launch a ship or a marriage were not identifiable as conforming
with an iterable model if it were not then identifiable in some way as a “citation”?
… in such a typology, the category of intention will not disappear; it will have its
place, but from that place it will no longer be able to govern the entire scene and
system of utterance (Derrida 18).
The entire act of assembly is coded and repeatable. The intention of assembly does not hold
supremacy over the act. Antiracists and racists can assemble. Intention, however, is pertinent in
the iteration; intention precisely distinguishes an antiracist assembly from a racist one. When
iterating unheeded acts, one may intend to indicate the epistemic injustice that is the deprivation
of appearance. Butler casts her focus on such intention and crafts an imperative: politicize
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citation (particularly, the citation of gender and sexuality). She acknowledges that “the
performative is one domain in which power acts as discourse” (Bodies that Matter 225).
Thereby, the discursive power struggle is dominated in the iteration: the repeater merely states
that “this exists; this is real!”
2011’s Occupy Wall Street Movement, through citation, prefigured communicative
democracy. Particularly, the use of the human mic, which has its roots in 1980s anti-nuclear
rallies, aims at directly engaging the problem of unheeded acts. The human mic is a technique in
which listeners “hear the speaker, repeat the message for other listeners, and signal uptake to the
speaker…[so that] the speaker can continually monitor which participants have heard the
linguistic form of the utterance” (Steinberg 714). The human mic does not end in mutual
identification or agreement but rather what Young views as understanding. Communicative
democracy’s telos is the “successful expression of experience and perspective, so that other
social positions learn” (Young 128). Such an understanding is not exhaustive but rather
considerate towards the limits of each expression to fully express a participant’s argument,
emotions, etc. R. Lila Steinberg does note that repetition may be subject to “change [in]
grammatical or prosodic elements” in order to match the intention of the repeaters (e.g.
“disagreement, emphasis, doubt,” etc.) (Steinberg 717). Such tonal shifts or aberrations in
enunciation highlight the political nature of iteration and intention but also potentially the limits
of speech acts.
The significance is that the speech act is heeded to some degree – indicating a shift from
spaces of appearance in which certain acts are denied recognition. The human mic, in practice,
presents the successes and failures of iteration. Occupy exemplifies how repetition can result in
new spaces of appearance. Arendt considers spaces of appearance as temporal and conclusive in
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the “disappearance or arrest of the activities” that brings the space into “being” (Arendt 199).
Thereby, the performative, critical iterations aforementioned bring new poleis into being.
However, when a human mic, for instance, is defunct, so is the space of appearance that it
creates. Iterations of unheeded acts generate spaces in which such speech may appear and be
real. As Butler and Young suggests, other bodily acts, such as body language, are often relegated
from deliberative models. Moreover, Warner indicates that genres of expression (such as poetry
and rhetoric) as well as whole material bodies ought to be included into discursive arenas in
order to truly achieve any claim of comprehensiveness. When marginalized communities
assemble, they create counterpublics; these arenas render participants real. Their bodily
repetition, their collective gathering, generates their conditions for appearance, their conditions
for reality.
Black American history includes many counterpublics who on behalf of their assemblage
generate spaces of appearance in which they and their linguistic and otherwise bodily acts are
recognizable, legible, and real. In his recent Democracy in Black, Eddie S. Glaude, Jr. elucidates
and exalts Black associational life – wrought out of exclusion – as the complex wherein Black
Americans could live, love, and deliberate. Glaude specifically highlights the Black Church
which “offered networks of interconnection across communities and states that enabled massive
mobilization of people and resources to challenge racial segregation throughout the south”
(Glaude 126). Assemblage, as bodily repetition, is a form of iteration that generates spaces of
appearance in which counterpublics may form to engage in critical politics. The Black Church
was specifically essential in the history of the American Civil Rights Movement as the primary
institution where Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee mobilized peaceful protestors. Funk musician James Brown’s 1968
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classic “Say It Loud – I’m Black and I’m Proud” itself encourages iteration with the goal of
bringing the song’s eponymous speech act into appearance, into recognition, and thereby into
reality.
Black American history includes many counterpublics who on behalf of their assemblage
generate spaces of appearance in which they and their linguistic and otherwise bodily acts are
recognizable, legible, and real. In his recent Democracy in Black, Eddie S. Glaude, Jr. elucidates
and exalts Black associational life – wrought out of exclusion – as the complex wherein Black
Americans could live, love, and deliberate. Glaude specifically highlights the Black Church
which “offered networks of interconnection across communities and states that enabled massive
mobilization of people and resources to challenge racial segregation throughout the south”
(Glaude 126). Young’s democratic model itself on its communicative inclusivity but does not
suggest a path towards its implementation and thereby remains a far-off concept. Performatives
however prefigure communicative democracy by creating spaces of appearance in which
excluded acts of publicity may be recognized and thereby included in discursive arenas. The
American Civil Rights Movement bespeaks the criticality of performatives. Glaude elucidates
the pertinence of performatives and the counterpublics they engender but laments the downfall of
such platforms, which he calls “free spaces,” and argues that “Black people still need them”
(Glaude 127). Glaude in many cases bemoans the continuing deprivation of the space of
appearance for Black Americans. What contemporary performatives, spaces, and counterpublics
then replace or can replace the political role of Black religious assemblage?
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Bringing forth the Digital polis
Deliberative democracy theory must attend to how the internet has changed publicity and
thereby democratic discourse. Even Michael Warner’s foundational theories of publicity cannot
speak to the affordances of networked communication. Editorship and publicity becomes more
accessible online especially with the advent of social networking services. Users of these
services can explicitly initiate, direct, and proliferate discussion and chains of discourse.
Moreover, these communicative means no longer vanish from accessibility once the act
concludes. Online, speech and embodied acts linger and remain. Thereby, not only should
political theories but also Arendt and Butler’s theories should be reassessed. The internet
augments the concept of the polis and political iteration.
Formerly, civilian publication might have required the outlet of the press or a publication
company which complicated political discourse. For instance, publicizing instances of racialized
brutality has been essential to Black American counterpublicity. Ironically, publicizing the act of
brutality has also been part and parcel of America’s racist past. Such is the complicated nature of
citationality. The main characteristic distinguishing both reproductive efforts is intention.
Despite the historic hypervisibility of Black Americans, the Black subject has been abject from
the discursive publics that systematize its subjugation (e.g. chattel servitude, racial
discrimination in voting, etc). The slave was one of Arendt’s hypothetical subjects deprived of
the space of appearance (Arendt 199). At variance with Karl Marx, who once asserted the
counterfactual “if a commodity could speak…,” Fred Moten’s seminal text on Black aesthetics,
In the Break, assesses the musicality and vocality of the historically commodified (Moten 9).
Moten seeks to uncover the phonography of photographs, such as the “nonneutralizable and
irreducible sounds” of Emmett Till’s funeral photograph (196); Till being a young Black

Clarke 13
teenager subject to a lynching. Markedly, Till’s mother, Mamie Bradley, asked for the media to
publicize her son’s brutalized body.
Moten argues for us to truly heed Mamie Till’s funeral photographs with an open
intentionality. He argues for a new form of spectatorship:
[We should] not only look at [Till’s photograph] but look at it in the context of an
aesthetics, look at it as if it were to be looked at, as if it were to be thought,
therefore, in terms of a kind of beauty, a kind of detachment, independence,
autonomy, that holds open the question of what looking might mean in general,
what the aesthetics of the photograph might mean for politics and what those
aesthetics might have meant for Mamie Bradley in the context of her demand that
her son’s face be seen, be shown that his death and her mourning be performed
(Moten 198).
Moten centers the intention of Mamie Bradley’s circulation. Precisely, he argues for careful
attention to the potential agencies and resistances embedded in the address and its addressor,
Till’s photograph and his mother. Such spectatorship has the aim of recognizing or
understanding the image and its source’s intention (without necessarily reaching agreement).
Such a spectator is the default archetype of Young’s communicative democracy. Notably, Mamie
Bradley’s publicizing is not an argument but rather a form of storytelling: a curation of an image.
Narratives “evoke sympathy while maintaining distance because the narrative also carries an
inexhaustible latent shadow, the transcendence of the Other, that there is always more to be told”
(Young 131). One who does not have exact experiences with Mamie Bradley can sympathize
with her pain but can never claim absolute knowledge of such pain.
On July 6th 2016, the spirit of Mamie Bradley haunted Diamond Reynolds’s decision to
livestream the extrajudicial killing of her boyfriend, Philando Castile. More than time
differentiates Mamie Bradley and Reynolds’s performances of their grief, and yet their similitude
is critical. Reynolds does employ an audiovisual image instead of a photograph. Moreover,
Reynolds uses Facebook Live, a digital application which allows the user to livestream
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audiovisual broadcasts and immediately circulate them on the social networking platform,
Facebook. Maintaining the intentionality and agency of a documentarian in her live account,
Reynolds notes the time, location, and context of the incident (Chappell & Domonoske).
Reynolds’s documentation speaks to how digitality enters the conversation of
communicative democracy, citation, and counterpublicity. The Web, in providing new means of
communication, provides new means of counterpublicity. Nevertheless, many publicity theorists
bemoan online discursive communities for a variety of reasons. Habermas, for instance, is
skeptical of the optimism of scholars like Joshua Meyrowitz who view new media as breaking
down socialized barriers and enabling deliberative egalitarianism. Habermas counters by arguing
that such “leveling of differences [accompanies] impotence in the face of an impenetrable
systemic complexity” (“Further Reflections” 456). Egalitarianism as a consequence of stringent
systemic complexity is both hardly egalitarian and fraught with potential dangers. Warner
himself decries the lack of “punctuality” involved in social media. Circulation is “highly
continuous” (“24/7 instant access”) as opposed to occurring periodically; public discourse on the
other hand is a “temporal framework.” The problem Warner presents is critical: how can online
publics “connect localized acts of reading to the modes of agency in the social imaginary of
modernity” (Publics and Counterpublics 97-8). Can modern individuals imagine agency when
constantly buffeted by media? Impenetrable systems and incessant circulation are two possible
complications with digital publics.
Warner has accurately anticipated our lived reality now. Warner’s ideas predate the rise
of what Nancy DiNucci called “Web 2.0” in a 1999 Print magazine article (DiNucci 32). The
non-periodic, nonstop continuity of mediatized publishing and reading is part and parcel of our
reality. Post-mid-2000s, social media networks and the proliferation of net-accessing
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technologies (e.g. personal computers, smart phones, etc.) mediate not only our means of
publicity but our entire lives. Since online commentating on politics and/or culture, online
shopping, and online communication with family members are now norms, the web is for many
the dominant means of accessing the spheres of politics, economy, and family. If, as theorists
Nancy Baym and danah boyd argue, “social mediation blurs boundaries and pushes mutual
redefinition between public and private,” the same applies for the categories of “online” and
“offline” (Baym & boyd 322). Digitized publicity is ubiquitous. Warner paves the way for other
speculations about its implications. Rather than being devastating critiques, Habermas and
Warner’s analyses provide sobering and helpful way to view new media.
These problems are quite related, yet Reynolds’s documentation in particular begs
Warner’s question. Warner’s problematic on how localized acts of spectatorship relate to agency
recurs. Those who tuned into Reynolds’s feed saw racialized brutality in a transmitted
immediacy. In “real time,” Reynolds publicized, and her followers watched. Facebook Live,
Periscope, and other accessible livestreaming applications complicate the temporal framework
which Warner deems is inherent to publicity. In such immediacy, there is little to no time to
reflect and develop rational or poetic critique. Simultaneously, Reynolds documents and mourns;
correspondingly, the viewer examines the situation’s context with the Castile’s dying body as the
video’s centerpiece. If Reynolds takes up the responsibility of performing and circulating
counterpublic discourse, what is the role of the onlooker?
Such responsibilities will likely be informed by the power dynamics associated with
digital media. Socially-mediated publicness,” as Baym and boyd call it, creates a new
relationship between dominant publics and counterpublics (320). Nathan Rambukkana considers
what kind of “digital privileges” emerge in this new reality (Rambukkana 32). Rambukkana
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implicitly asks what does the matrix of domination look like in a world where digital matrices
mediate our lived reality? What does digital racism, sexism, and classism look like? Both
existing forms of domination and resistance may find new expressions. How may one use the
web to upend mediatized repression, exploitation, and lack of access? Digital affordances
provide novel forms of access and (in)visibility, but are there cyberspaces of appearance? Do
some experience the deprivation of such spaces? Quite obviously, one who does not have access
to the internet may be deprived. However, what about the unheeded acts of the internet; the
explicit performances that are marginalized and unheard? If citation, in a non-digital context, can
serve as creating new, inclusive spaces of appearance, then citation in a digital context may
relate fundamentally. Rambukkana, taking the cue of communication theorist J.D. Peters, argues
that “the political role of communication media…[must be] to ‘unfix’ staid communication
patterns, to refigure the public conversation about important issues and topics, […] [and] to build
better communication across and between cultural and subcultural spaces” (31-2). Post Web 2.0
not only adds nuance to (counter)publicity but also suggests new spaces upon which such
publicity manifests.
Sociologist Manuel Castells explicates these new forms of digitized power and
counterpower through his theory of Communication Power. Castells defines internet-based
communication as “mass self-communication” due to its current grounding and pervasion of
older forms of communication such as the press, television, and radio (Communication Power
65). Moreover, Castells stresses “self” in the notion because he deems “autonomy” as the
production, circulation, and retrieval of messages over a network (Networks of Outrage 6-7). An
individual’s network autonomy thereby is their capacities of engaging in publicity as a producer,
curator, and consumer. As one platform of mass self-communication, social media operates
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through a power complex that Castells simply calls “Communication Power.” Communication
power is a quadripartite concept comprised of network-making power, networking power,
network power, and networked power (Communication Power 42).
Twitter, as a social network platform, is a solid frame to illustrate Castells’ theory. The
arche of each form of power is network-making power, or the “capacity to set up and program a
network” on the basis of one’s “financial, institutional, legal, and technological means” (420).
Networking power, Castells theorizes, as a “gatekeeper” power decides who is included in or
excluded from a network (43). Twitter only suspends accounts that are spam, malware,
“abusive,” or unlawful according to copyright and trademark law (The Twitter Rules). Twitter
allows members to report other members on the basis of these rules. These reports make their
way to a judicial group hired by the network to judge these complaints. Otherwise, theoretically
anyone can enter the social network. The more people use Twitter the more network power
Twitter possesses. Network power, in this case, indicates how much Twitter can impose its terms
of conditions, or what Castells calls “protocols of communication,” on its participants
(Communication Power 43-4). These explicitly top-down, vertical forms of power are also the
power that constructs the platform on which digital publicity can emerge.
Networked power, on the other hand, implies a relationship between “nodes” over other
“nodes,” rather than programmers over nodes. This is a form of power within the network – it
does not necessarily imply an “outside” of the network. However, networked power, inside
Twitter for example, may have implications for one’s social capital outside Twitter. Nonetheless,
Castells identifies the networked power of communication networks as “agenda-setting,
managerial, and editorial decision-making power in the organizations that own and operate
multimedia communication networks” (419). Technically, on Twitter, no matter if one is a
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journalist, actor, musician, CEO, or politician, the number of one’s “followers” in a sense
signifies their networked power. Twitter users exercising their networked power can take the
form of opening up a chain of discourse about a particular event. Thereby, networked power
resurfaces in digitized publics and counterpublics.
Social media networks feature a decentered power exemplified in Twitter’s hashtag (#)
function. Hashtags, first suggested in 2007 by Chris Messina, are powerful tools to anchor
conversations, ideas, and groups (Messina). They operate to the extent that someone with few
Twitter followers may still manage to direct a networked conversation. However, those with
many Twitter followers may disseminate hashtagged messages, phrases, and images to a larger
public. By 2013, Twitter successfully exported the hashtag to other popular social networks, such
as Facebook, “Flickr, Tumblr, Google+, and…Instagram” (Warren). In other words, Messina’s
search-based hybrid inserted itself into the fabric of most social media networks. The hashtag
becomes a constituent of Web 2.0’s largest networks. Markedly, the hashtag is an explicit
citation; its purpose is to be quoted. Rambukkana views hashtags as “hybrids in the taxonomy of
types of information” in that they are both “text and metatext; information and tag; [and]
pragmatic and metapragmatic speech.” Their “deictic” nature affirms their citationality; their
“indexical” aspect distinguishes them from non-digital citations. Although the “[hashtag]
emerges temporally,” Rambukkana argues that “it’s a node of continued context cross media,
conversations, and locales” (Rambukkana 30). Hashtags sustain chains of discourse but also are
sustained indefinitely online.
Although hashtags are digital acts that explicitly announce, occasion, and indicate
themselves, in the case of indefinite endurance, they are also pars pro toto for digital publicity.
Deletion of digitally publicized text and image is never quite deletion. Posting or uploading
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anything onto the internet fixes the item into the ever-lingering metadata composite that
constitutes the World Wide Web. As new media theorist Wendy Hui Kyong Chun argues:
Memory allegedly makes digital media an ever-increasing archive in which no
piece of data is lost. This always-thereness of new media is also what links it to
the future as future simple, as what will be, as predictable progress. By saving the
past, it was supposed to make the future easier. More damningly, it was to put into
place the future simple through the threat of constant exposure (Chun 154).
Metadata is the enduring trace of deleted digital media. Supposed deletion does not exhaustively
limit recoverability. The archival aspect of digital publicity immediately transforms the
contemporary into history. Chun elsewhere clarifies this argument by indicating how “older
post[s] can always be ‘discovered’ as new; new post[s] [are] already old” (169). What, then, is
obsolescence online? The hashtag, the shared video, and the podcast are all subject to digital
“resuscitability,” what Chun calls “the undead of information” (171). Moreover, upon exposure
and circulation, digitality enhances citationality. Human memory does not limit digital citation;
people can forward the original messages, images, and acts and thereby avoid a Chinese
Whispers dilemma (what Americans call the “telephone game”). Chun theorizes the internet’s
repetitive circularity as a new temporality: an “ephemerality [that] is made to endure” (171). All
forms of digital publicity are subject to enduring ephemerality.
Hence, the concept of the space of appearance requires a necessary update. Temporality
grounds the space of the appearance. Arendt’s space of appearance concludes with the
“disappearance or arrest of the activities” that bring the space into “being” (Arendt 199).
Enduring ephemerality implies that both disappearance and arrest are now impeded. A blog post
is not quite subject to the entropy that degrades a speech act or a written work into oblivion. If
temporality has changed to some degree online, what may be said about spatiality? Before reinvoking the question of cyberspatiality, perhaps the appellation itself betrays a particular
presupposition. Namely, the concept of cyberspace grounds itself on what new media theorist
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Nathan Jurgenson calls “digital dualism.” Jurgenson complicates such dualism through the
frame of subjectivity – or the possibility of a second self, a digital self. Jurgenson proposes
another subjectivity, an “augmented” one, wherein “we are not crossing in and out of separate
digital and physical realities…but instead live in one reality...[as] a Haraway-like cyborg self
comprised of a physical body as well as our digital profile, acting in constant dialogue”
(Jurgenson). Whatever was once deemed cyberspace is now a kind of notational appendage to
what was once deemed physical space. The divide is breached so often that the division as a
concept has become obsolete. Digitality is shown to augment Arendt’s concept on the basis of
Chun’s temporality and Jurgenson’s implied spatiality.
The digital publication of racialized brutality bespeaks digitality’s influence on Arendt’s
concept. On July 17th 2014, New York resident Ramsey Orta filmed a video of officer Daniel
Pantaleo choking fellow resident Eric Garner to death. Captioned with a hashtag of Garner’s
final words, “I can’t breathe,” the video circulated social media networks. Garner’s arrest video
shows the malleability of the indexical hashtag. “I Can’t Breathe” to some degree transcends its
audiovisual source, becomes a hashtagged caption on social networks, and finds expression in
the verbal chants, protest paraphernalia, and markered placards of the resulting assemblies
(Taylor). All of which exemplify the citationality of Garner’s final speech act, his resistance in
the face of public authority. With this said, due to circulation and proliferation of Garner’s
speech act and Orta’s audiovisual image, the augmented space of appearance that emerges
through the repetition of these acts does not subside with the conclusion of an assembly. As
Castells notes, the advantage of an internet-based movement exists in its ability to circumvent
“repression of [its] liberated spaces by maintaining communication among the people in the
movement and society at large” (Networks of Outrage 229). Moreover, movement does not
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subside with the lessened use of a hashtag. Garner’s arrest video shows the malleability of the
indexical tag. “I Can’t Breathe,” for instance, transcends its audiovisual source, becomes
metatext in social networks, and finds material expression in the verbal chants and markered
placards of the protest. The context, in other words, constitutes the caption, and people repeat
Garner’s final words as if to uplift his arrest and its systemic causes into public discourse. Even
when people return home from the occupied urban street, these augmented fields of recognition
endure.
Augmented spaces of appearance are increasingly the typical form of polis and political
engagement. The internet spills into political publicity just as it seems to do with other aspects of
life. These augmented spaces are largely brought to form via a digital publicity which implies a
power dynamic which Castells clarifies. Networked power occasions the possibility for unheeded
speech to get virally proliferated throughout the World Wide Web. Digital communication also
implies enduring ephemerality which renders it difficult to repress and arrest activities online.
Augmented spaces of appearance then enable enhanced modes of assembly, political
engagement, and critical repetition.
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Bearing Witness, Poetically
Digitality does not grant critical repetition with a utopic lack of ethical impediments. The
social media spectator who shares livestreamed racialized brutality does not occupy an ethically
impenetrable position. Such a spectator generates an augmented space of appearance for the
unheeded act which can be a critical function. Though, once a repeated act is legible and real,
new problems manifest. Iteration can be politicized, weaponized, and thereby misappropriated.
Moreover, once iteration renders acts legible by large publics, the function of repetition changes
and may even become a form of anesthetization. In other words, just as it augments the critical
functions of repetition, digitality can emphasize and accelerate the risks of repetition.
The risk of framing precedes repetition and lies within every act, unheeded or not. One of
the reasons why Young celebrates storytelling as an essential aspect of discourse is that it is a
form of evidence that is always-already lacking. Communicative democracy is inherently a
pluralist framework that has the egalitarian aim of understanding without the utopic aim of
mutual identification and agreement. Storytellers bespeak their own social positionality and
experiences while retaining accounts “not only of [their] life and history but of every other
position that affects [their] experience” (Young 132). Evidently, when Young uses the term
storytelling, she refers to documentation as opposed to fictive imaginings. Storytelling can serve
to enhance a listener’s understanding of how their actions may influence someone else’s reality.
Such explicit situatedness also implies what Young calls its “inexhaustible latent shadow:” “the
transcendence of the other, that there is always more to be told” (131). The testimony, a
particular point of view, is a frame, and the ambiguous limits of frames must be retained when
discussing storytelling and the iteration of such.
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Photos and videos are frames amenable to citationality that avoid the pitfalls of memorybased storytelling but are also pervious to the risk of ambiguity. Young obviously has no issue
with a lack of objectivity. The aforesaid situatedness of subjective experience is critical to
understanding how particular actions, mandates, and initiatives affect others. Specifically,
photographic and videographic media allow for explicit representations that speech and written
forms of storytelling cannot. Mere eyewitness occasions an immediate skepticism that the photo
and video do not. Testifiers can largely fabricate their stories in a way that photographers and
videographers cannot. Whereas the testifier employs rhetoric and verbal embellishment to
emphasize, emote, and interrogate, photos and videos can more directly sketch reality while also
embellishing, emoting, and interrogating through use of artistic technique (e.g. zooming in for
emphasis, etc.). Young again wishes to retain these persuasive and impressive elements as they
are key to subjective account. Images, both static and audiovisual, are cited online and circulated
through social media networks. Moreover, the original photographers and videographers may
appear in their images in order to emphasize the image’s source (e.g. Diamond Reynolds’s
livestream). In such cases, critical repetition may involve the circulation of both act and
intention. Users forward the original statement, evading the Chinese Whispers dilemma, but may
also forward the original actor’s commentary on their act, their statement of their intention,
which avoids misconstrual.
Yet, such an ideal situation is not always the case; such misconstrual of intentions is
possible in digital citation. Digitality cannot directly buffer against misinterpretation. Images
may not be sufficient enough for their intention. The actor may publicize an image that detracts
from their intention – whether by explicitly or implicitly contradicting their intentions or, via
framing, leaving out germane information that may validate or invalidate their intention.
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Noticeably, these problematic are different than the marginalization and discounting that
unheeded acts and actors undergo. Nevertheless, these issues are rather pertinent to the repetition
of the unheeded act. If the act itself cannot accessibly portray its intention, repeaters may
misconstrue and thereby misappropriate the unheeded act – another form of unheeding which
would be hardly conducive to a communicative democracy.
Markedly, once an unheeded act is rendered legible in a space of appearance, the
problems of repetition exceed mere misconstrual and misappropriation. Firstly, repeating heeded
acts may serve to anesthetize them. Susan Sontag in her work On Photography reflects on two
particular instances: the first sighting of an unheeded photograph of suffering and the repeated
exposure to such images. Viewing a photograph that portrays some sort of injustice can be quite
emotionally and physically poignant. Sontag recounts a childhood experience in which she first
saw images from the Bergen-Belsen and Dachau concentration camps. The images impressed
upon her to the extent that she “felt irrevocably grieved, wounded” and that “a part of her
feelings started to tighten…went dead…[and] is still crying” (Sontag 20). Sontag’s experience
perfectly displays how images can evoke visceral and bodily sympathetic responses. The first
sighting of something that was previously invisible, impossible, or unimaginable has a potent
impressiveness. Sontag then writes that “an event known through photographs certainly becomes
more real that it would have been if one had never seen the photographs…but after repeated
exposure to images it also becomes less real” (20). Notably, digital publicity’s capacity to widely
and immediately proliferate media may in turn work to desensitize acts. Lingering accessible,
and capable of rapid circulation, repeated online acts may become stale and one with the
woodwork – disappearance through omnipresence. The principle of diminishing returns that
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Sontag describes is such that images of suffering can become trite and images of taboo can
become cliché.
Ubiquity thereby is not the aim of critical repetition. The desensitizing aspect of ubiquity
nullifies the purpose of critical repetition: to make unheeded acts a component of the space of
appearance. Sontag demonstrates how ubiquity is rather a form of non-appearance. Axiomatic
self-evidence is another form of ubiquity in which acts are so foundational to discursivity that
they become unquestioned matters of fact. In democratic arenas, however, labeling certain acts
as untouchable is dangerous. Science, for instance, cycles between several theories that are
repeatable to the point of near-certainty. However, it is always possible that a scientific
revolution can render a dogmatic principle obsolete. Critical repetition, in such a case, may
challenge ubituitous acts into a space of reasoning and criticism, and such re-litigation can be
crucial in deciding whether or not foundational principles of discursivity are sound. Selfevidence, to some degree, can be the Achilles Heel of discursivity, and critical repetition can
occasion re-evaluation.
If repetition can disappear certain acts, then repetition can be a form of marginalization.
In 2016, following the publicizing of police brutality (incl. Reynolds’s livestream), journalists
and activists linked the widely shared videos of racialized police killings to 20th-century
lynching postcards (Devega; Blay). The postcard practice was a form of private correspondence
that featured a photograph of a lynching. For starters, lynching postcards are private addresses of
public spectacles, and thereby, they are inherently different than that of publicizing brutality.
Nonetheless, these articles do indicate an anxiety about repeating unheeded acts and their
suspicion may be justified. Specifically, these critics cast their focus on the repeated circulation
of publicized police brutality by all-day news television networks. The sensationalization of
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press media has largely worked to transform its pieces of news into commodities. Thereby, the
repetition of emotionally affective stories, images, and videos generates profits. As Sontag’s
anecdote suggests, unheeded acts are oftentimes evocative. Thereby, sensationalized press can
transform, say, Diamond Reynolds’s livestream, which features the brutalization and killing of
her Black boyfriend, Philando Castile, into a vendible object – generating profits by publicizing
suffering. On 24-hour news networks, the repetition is cycled; a news station may replay the
audiovisuals of Castile’s death throughout the day. Sensationalized press distinctly engenders the
dual process of commodification and desensitization of acts.
Markedly, considering power dynamics ground discursive spaces, critical repetition
implies the use and generation of forms of social capital. Re-invoking Castellsian networked
power demonstrates how such capital affects the success of critical repetition. If an unheeded
actor repeats another unheeded actor, there is little chance of the citation entering public
discourse. A surplus of networked power augments the chance of acts reaching audiences. Even
counterpublics are built on complexes of networked power, some participants have larger
audiences than others. Repetition necessitates the use of one’s networked power. One might
argue that some may repeat certain acts in order to generate networked power and thereby
capitalizing to some degree. Such a criticism merely outlines the framework of publicity. What
then differentiates social profiteering from the financial profiteering of the sensationalized press?
Perhaps, instead, both are dangerous and can potentially become forms of excessive
mistreatment. When one repeats an unheeded act solely to rake in social or financial capital, the
repetition becomes a form of exploitation; the act becomes commodity.
Another issue related to repetition is trivialization. For instance, #BlackLivesMatter very
well may be the most persistent and significant political hashtag. Alicia Garza, Opal Tometi, and
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Patrisse Cullors share coinage of the hashtag, originally a response to George Zimmerman’s
acquittal for killing Black teenager Trayvon Martin in July 2013. Merely retweeting
#BlackLivesMatter recognizes the original intention of expressing “outrage against police
aggression and racist violence” (Rickford 35). Thereby, the hashtag and its associated campaign
to publicize and work against racialized police brutality informs not only Diamond Reynolds’s
livestream but also Ramsey Orta’s filming of Eric Garner. The Movement for Black Lives, a
multi-organization, international campaign against systemic forms of racism, has employed the
hashtag to the extent that the protest campaign has been called the Black Lives Matter
movement. Critics have taken to mocking the movement’s central hashtag through imitation;
counters to “#BlackLivesMatter” include “#PoliceLivesMatter,” “#BlueLivesMatter,” and most
frequently, “#AllLivesMatter.” The latter has been uttered by politicians, celebrities, and others
who disagree with the movement’s tactics (Rickford 40). However, in its ubiquity, the hashtag
has inspired trivializations; inanimate objects, animals, and other objects’ lives now matter as a
way to detract from a social justice movement’s charge. In its proliferation, the Movement for
Black Lives’s hashtag has spawned imitations that trivialize the original tag’s intent: an end to
systemic racism.
Considering the risks of repetition, repeaters must carefully attend to how they echo
unheeded acts. If, to Butler, Derrida, and other theorists of the performative, the reiterative act’s
intention has no supremacy over its form, perhaps the reverse is accurate. Such a suggestion to
some degree revives Warner’s assertion that publicity is “poetic world making” – to the extent
that Warner highlights the importance of form and genre to the act. Disobeying conventions
genre and form is a mode of transgression, and changing the form of acts may also serve to
diminish possible indignations. Whereas Butler argues that we must politicize citation, one may
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wish to enact that politicization by poeticizing citation. Such an imperative serves the purpose of
both illustrating the importance of fully attending to unheeded acts but also attending to one’s
own reiterative acts. Such poeticizing is a careful kind of suppression and editing that seeks to
repeat otherwise.
Attending to the specifics of police brutalism may serve as an option instead of repeating
visceral images of brutality. In May 2015, the African American Policy Forum (AAPF), cofounded by legal theorist Kimberlé Crenshaw, released the report “Say Her Name: Resisting
Police Brutality Against Women” to outline the tenets of their “#SayHerName” hashtagged
charge. In summation, anti-black racism and misogyny converge to create particularly egregious
measures of police brutality. On July 13th 2015, the death of Black Lives Matter activist Sandra
Bland provoked the Forum to update their report and proliferate their hashtag (“Say Her Name”).
On July 18th 2015, prior to the release of the dashcam footage of Bland’s arrest, a Movement for
Black Lives contingent in Phoenix, AZ disrupted Bernie Sanders and Martin O’Malley’s press
conference at Daily Kos’s Netroots Nation conference. Disrupters chanted “#SayHerName” and
also demanded that both Democratic candidates echo the call (Bouie). Much akin to those who,
instead of repeating the video of officer Daniel Pantaleo choking Eric Garner, repeat the victim
final words, “I Can’t Breathe,” via placards, chants, and hashtags, few have taken to merely
stating the particulars of these documented cases. In the case of Chicagoan Laquan McDonald’s
videotaped brutalism, protestors chanted “sixteen shots” in reference to how many bullets officer
James Van Dyke fired into McDonald – a poetic means of conveyance (Davey and Smith).
Appealing to particulars is one such means of poeticizing repetition.
Alteration may also serve as an answer to Hartman’s particular problem of invoking
historical indignities. In Claudia Rankine’s poetic collection Citizen, a lynching postcard, to
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return to our aforementioned object of concern, closes a section of the book. The image is
altered; John Lucas, Rankine’s partner, modifies a famous lynching postcard by removing the
bodies of lynched Black men (Rankine). What Lucas achieves is a change in orientation. No
longer is the spectator of the altered photograph implicated in the spectacle of Black death.
Instead, the viewer is directed towards the casual, festive racism of the white crowd. Therein,
Lucas – as a poetic repeater – speaks to the horrid atrocities of the past but does so with a form
that does not resuscitate the spectacle.
Poetic witness, or carefully attending to the form of critical repetition, is the solution to
political theory’s multifarious problem of unheeded acts. In a networked age, bearing witness to
unheeded acts and people can backfire and further marginalize the neglected. A poeticized
repetition serves to counter this regression by modifying the easily trivialized, desensitized, and
exploited image or act. Poetic witness answers Hartman’s question of how one may convey the
terrible without reenacting the terrible. When Butler notes that “the effects of performatives…do
not conclude at the terminus of a given statement or utterance,” the critical theorist speaks to the
lingering afterlife of the act within the Space of Appearance (Bodies that Matter 241). Poetic
witness can be best described as carefully attending to the repeated act in light of its entrance
into the contemporary, augmented polis.
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